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Framing the Court. Political Reactions to the Ruling on the Declaration of 
Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the reactions by political actors to the ruling of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court on the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament. It is 
suggested that political framings of the ruling can be classified into the legalist, 
attitudinal and institutional academic models of judicial behaviour. As will be shown, 
these models have a normative dimension, with implications for the ideal of the Rule of 
Law. These implications are skilfully captured and exploited by political actors as part 
of a wider battle for the framing of the ruling. The Rule of Law thus becomes politicised 
as a result of the tension around the judicialisation of the so-called Catalan ‘sovereignist 
process’. 
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Presentation 
 
On 23 January 2013, the Catalan Parliament passed the ‘Declaration on the Sovereignty 
and right to decide of the people of Catalonia’. Amongst the ultimate aims of the 
Declaration was the holding of a referendum through which Catalan citizens could 
decide on the status of Catalonia vis-à-vis the Spanish State, including the option for 
independence. The Spanish Government, as well as the main Spanish political parties, 
opposed the content of the Declaration. Through the State’s Attorney, the Spanish 
Government filed an objection of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court, 
which on 26 March 2014 issued a ruling stating that the Declaration was contrary to the 
Spanish Constitution as long as it included the idea of ‘Catalan sovereignty’. The Court, 
however, also considered that the ‘right to decide’ of Catalan citizens could be 
considered constitutional if exercised in accordance with the Spanish constitutional 
system. 
 
Political reactions to the ruling were diverse, ranging from furious attacks against the 
Court to closed defences of the institution as guarantor of the constitutional framework 
and the Rule of Law. Such reactions will be studied in this article. Most literature on 
Judicial Politics focuses on courts’ decisions on merits, which are explained through 
different theories of decision-making. Although these theories will be used in this article 
as well, my focus is instead on political framings of the judicial outcome. As will be 
illustrated, beyond their neutralist, positivist use in academic research, theories of 
judicial decision-making have unavoidable normative implications related to the Rule of 
Law and the role of constitutional courts in a democratic society. With the aid of 
framing theory, this article explains how simplified versions of such theories are also 
 3 
discursively mobilised by political actors for strategic purposes as rival narratives about 
the ruling with legitimating and de-legitimating effects. While parties opposing the 
referendum implied that the ruling was the result of a neutral application of the 
Constitution to the case, pro-referendum actors often accused the Court of being 
politically biased. My claim is that framings of the ruling depended on the gap between 
the preferences of politicians and the judicial outcome. Furthermore, in the context of 
the Catalan sovereignist process, these legalist and political framings had different 
implications in terms of the legitimacy of the Spanish Constitution to channel political 
conflict over the issues of self-determination and independence. 
 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After this brief introduction, I will 
provide a description of the background of the case, briefly summarising the 
decentralised political organisation of the Spanish State as well as the role of the 
Constitutional Court in such a political structure. Then, I will explore my theoretical 
framework, which combines theories of judicial decision-making and framing theories 
in the study of political reactions to the rulings of courts. Subsequently, I will devote a 
few lines to explain the methodology and sources of the paper. In the next section, I will 
describe the most recent political events in Catalonia and the current scenario. After 
that, I will explore the very ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the 
Declaration of Catalan Parliament from the perspectives of the legalist, attitudinal and 
institutional theories of judicial decision-making, presenting them as alternative 
narratives. Next, I will show how, depending on their preferences, political actors 
selected some of these different narratives as a framing strategy. I will finish with some 
conclusions about the case.   
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The role of the Constitutional Court in contemporary decentralised Spain 
 
After the death of the dictator Franco, the formerly repressed demands for self-
government of the so-called ´historic nationalities’ -such as Catalonia or the Basque 
Country- flourished in Spain
1. According to Hopkin, the country ‘embarked in 1977 on 
a progressive and profound decentralization of political and administrative functions 
affecting the whole of State’2. This process of decentralisation was made possible by the 
political agreements reached during the period of transition to democracy, which 
crystallised in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (hereinafter ‘SC’).  
 
Article 2 SC states that the Constitution is based ‘on the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish Nation’ but also that ‘it recognises and guarantees the right to self-government 
of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed’. Art.143 of the Constitution 
allows for the creation of Autonomous Communities, which shall enjoy self-
government for the management of their interests (Art.137 SC) and have as their basic 
institutional rule a Statute of Autonomy (Art.147 SC). According to Aja and Colino, 
this constitutional framework ´displayed a great degree of flexibility and openness’3 and 
                                                          
1
 Luis Moreno, ‘Decentralization in Spain’, in: 36 Regional Studies (2002), p. 399, at 
pp.399-400. Enric Martinez-Herrera, ‘From nation-building to building identification 
with political communities: Consequences of political decentralization in Spain, the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia’, in: 41 European Journal of Political Research 
(2002), p.421, at p.428. 
2
 Jonathan Hopkin, ‘Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain’, in: 15 Party 
Politics (2009), p.179, at  p.191. 
3
 Eliseo Aja and César Colino, ‘Multilevel structures, coordination and partisan politics 
in Spanish intergovernmental relations’, in: 12 Comparative European Politics (2014), 
p.444, at p.445. 
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permitted Autonomous Communities to have an active role in the process of devolution 
from which they were benefiting. The result has been a deep decentralisation of the 
political structure of the State, to the point that some authors speak about a process of 
federalisation of Spain
4
. 
 
The Constitutional Court has been considered of paramount importance in this process
5
. 
According to Shapiro, one of the explanations for the blooming of constitutional review 
is precisely political decentralisation, as ‘federalism required some institution to police 
its complex constitutional boundary arrangements’6. In Spain, the function of 
constitutional review is entrusted to an independent institution, a Constitutional Court 
inspired in the Kelsenian model that is currently dominant in continental Europe
7
. 
Together with other functions, most notably the defence of the constitutional rights of 
citizens, the Constitutional Court ensures the respect by legislation of the constitutional 
mandates, including those that delimit the respective competences of State level organs 
                                                          
4
 Robert Agranoff and Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarín, ´Toward Federal Democracy in 
Spain: An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations’, in: 27 Publius (1997), p.1. 
Gemma Sala, ‘Federalism without Adjectives in Spain’, in: 44 Publius (2014), p.109. 
5
 Luis Moreno, ‘Federalization and Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain’, in: 27 
Publius (1997), p.65 at p.70. 
6
 Martin Shapiro, ‘The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy’, in Martin Shapiro 
and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law Politics and Judicialization, p.148, at p.148. 
7
 For a discussion on constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of a constitutional 
review of legislation, see, inter alia, Michael Rosenfeld, ‘The Rule of Law and the 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’, in: 74 Southern California Law Review 
(2001), p.1307. Luc B. Tremblay, ‘General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the 
Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law’, in: 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(2003), p. 525. Dimitrios Kyritsis, ‘Constitutional Review in Representative 
Democracy’, in: 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2012), p. 297. Or Bassok and 
Yoav Dotan, ‘Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?’, in: 11 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law (2013), p.13. 
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and of Autonomous Communities. According to Art.161.1.c SC, the Court can solve 
‘conflicts of competences between the State and the Autonomous Communities or 
between the Autonomous Communities themselves’. Additionally, Art.161.2 SC states 
that ‘the [Spanish] Government may appeal to the Constitutional Court against 
provisions and resolutions adopted by the bodies of the Autonomous Communities’. 
This latter article was precisely the provision invoked by the Spanish Government to 
bring before the Court the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament. The 
new decision of the Court was issued just a few years after its polemical ruling on the 
reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (STC 31/2010)
8
, and it again placed the 
institution at the centre of debates regarding the territorial politics of Spain. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Theories of Judicial Decision-Making as a Political 
Weapon 
 
In this article, I aim to show that theories of judicial decision-making are not the realm 
of scholars only, but that they are mobilised by political actors in defence of their 
interests. The Judicial Politics literature usually speaks of three different models or 
theories of judicial decision-making: the legalist, attitudinal and institutionalist models
9
. 
                                                          
8
 On this ruling, see, inter alia, Carles Viver Pi-Sunyer, ‘El Tribunal Constitucional, 
¿”Sempre, només…i indiscutible”? La funció constitucional dels estatuts en l’àmbit de 
la distribución de competències segons la STC 31/2010’, in: 12 Revista d’Estudis 
Autonòmics i Federals (2011), p.363. Joaquim Ferret Jacas, ‘Nació, símbols i drets 
historics’, in: 12 Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals (2011), p.44. 
9
 Inter alia, Britta Redher, ‘What is Political about Jurisprudence? Courts, Politics and 
Political Science in Europe and the United States’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/5 
(2007). Arthur Dyevre, ‘Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a 
general theory of judicial behavior’, in: 2 European Political Science Review (2010), p. 
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I do not claim that these theories directly fed political discourses but rather that political 
framings can be classified into the three dominant theories of judicial decision-making 
for taxonomical and analytical purposes. Each of the three models will be studied 
individually in the next lines: 
 
- The legalist approach. A traditional way to understand the activity of courts is the 
legalist model, in which judicial behaviour is depicted as ‘based on legal logic and 
legal reasoning’10. According to Segal and Spaeth11, in this model, a court ‘decides 
disputes before it in the light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis precedent, the plain 
meaning of the Constitution and statutes, and the intent of the framers’. It must be 
acknowledged that the legalist approach is more an abstract type than a description 
of the actual work of most law scholars
12
. However, as an abstract type, this view of 
judicial decision-making seems to be the closest to an ideal understanding of courts 
                                                                                                                                                                          
297. See also Michael A. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman, The Constrained Court. Law, 
Politics and the Decisions the Justices Make 2011. Harold Spaeth ‘Reflections about 
Judicial Politics’, in Gregory Caldeira, Daniel Kelemen and Keith Whittington, The 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, p. 752. Jeffrey R. Lax, ‘The New Judicial 
Politics of Legal Doctrine’, in: 14 Annual Review of Political Science (2011), p. 131. 
David Landau, ‘The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A 
New Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America’, in: 37 The George 
Washintong International Law Review (2005), p.687. Howard Gillman and Cornell W. 
Clayton, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 1999. 
10
 Karen Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’, in Anne M. 
Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and 
National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence, p. 227, at p.230. 
11
 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited 2002, p.86.  
12
 As stated by Clayton, ‘the legalist model (...) does not rely upon the simplistic, 
mechanical, apolitical jurisprudence’ that attitudinalists suggest. Cornell W. Clayton, 
‘The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms’, in 
Howard Gillman and Cornell W. Clayton, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New 
Institutionalist Approaches, p.15, at p. 27. 
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as independent and neutral actors. Unlike in the rest of the approaches ‘in the 
legalist paradigm (…) politicians are given virtually no role in influencing legal 
interpretation of the legislation’13. 
 
- The attitudinal approach. It is said that the attitudinal model had its genesis in 
American Legal Realism, although melded with some key concepts of political 
science, psychology and economics
14
. The attitudinal model assumes ‘that judges 
decide cases in light of their brute policy preferences’15. According to this model, 
progressive magistrates will tend to make progressive interpretations of the law and 
thus make progressive decisions when adjudicating disputes. The opposite will 
occur with conservative magistrates. According to Britta Redher
16
, the attitudinal 
model considers that ‘personal preferences and values are the most important 
variable in explaining judicial behavior’.  
 
- The institutional approach. The institutional model is a departure from the 
attitudinal model, with important theoretical implications. Like the attitudinal 
model, it assumes that judges have policy preferences beyond the neutral 
application of law to the cases, but unlike such model, it considers that, when 
seeking their goals, the behaviour of magistrates is constrained by their institutional 
                                                          
13
 Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence’, at 
p.233. 
14
 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, p.86. 
15
 Dyevre, ‘Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics’, at pp.297-300. 
16
 Redher, ‘What is Political about Jurisprudence?’ at p.12. 
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environment
17
. Dyevre distinguishes two types of institutional approach: internalist 
and externalist
18
. The internalist model assumes that institutional rules of decision-
making within the court, such as the number of votes necessary to pass a decision 
or the prohibition of dissenting opinions, have an impact on judges’ decisions. The 
externalist model, in contrast, analyses the wider institutional frame in which courts 
behave and, in particular, the institutional rules that regulate their relations with 
other branches of government. What the two institutionalist models have in 
common is their depiction of courts and magistrates as strategic actors.   
 
In this article, I do not aim to test which of these three approaches best describes 
judicial decision-making but to understand what the normative implications of each are 
and how they are captured by political actors. The legalist approach overlaps with a 
normative ideal: the ideal of unbiased, independent and non-partisan courts simply 
applying the law to cases, which is an essential part of the notion of the Rule of Law. 
The attitudinal and institutional approaches deviate from this normative ideal by 
suggesting that political variables influence the decisions of courts. Unlike the legalist 
approach, the attitudinal and institutional approaches are not normative per se, but they 
nonetheless have ‘unintended’ normative implications. Experimental research has 
shown that legalist depictions of judicial activity engender in citizens more positive 
reactions than political depictions
19
. As stated by Nicholson and Howard, if the public 
                                                          
17
 Dyevre, ‘Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics’. Redher, ‘What is 
Political about Jurisprudence?’. 
18
 Dyevre, ‘Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics’, at p. 302. 
19
 Vanessa Baird and Amy Gangl. ‘Shattering the myth of legality: The impact of the 
media’s framing of Supreme Court procedures on perceptions of fairness’, in: 27 
Political Psychology (2006), p. 597 at p.597. 
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perceives a decision ‘as biased or partisan, the decision might undermine the legitimacy 
of the Court. The justification behind this reasoning is simple: Courts are supposed to 
decide cases based on the law, not on policy preferences’20.  
 
In my view, these different normative implications of legalist and political approaches 
to judicial decision-making are captured by political actors, which mobilise them as part 
of their framing strategies. According to Chong and Druckman ‘the major premise of 
framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be 
construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations’21. Nelson and 
Kinder consider that ‘the framing of issues –by partisan elites and mass media 
organizations- shapes public understanding of the roots of contemporary problems and 
the merits of alternative solutions’22. With the judicialisation of politics currently being 
a frequent phenomenon
23
, it is expectable that political actors will develop framing 
strategies to respond to judicial decisions. Literature on courts and political framings is 
still scarce, although there are some promising works
24
. However, none of these studies 
                                                          
20
 Stepehn Nicholson.and Robert M. Howard, ‘Framing Support for the Supreme Court 
in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore’,in:  65 The Journal of Politics (2003), p.676  at 
p.677. 
21
 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, in: 10 Annual Review of 
Political Science (2007), p. 103 at p.104. 
22
 Thomas Nelson and Donald .R. Kinder. ‘Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in 
American Public Opinion’, in: 58 The Journal of Politics (1996), p. 1055 at p.1055. 
23
 Lars Blichner and Anders Molander. ‘What is Juridification?’, ARENA Working 
Papers, N.14 March 2005, on line at 
https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2005/wp05_14.pdf  (15.09.2014) 
 
24
 See, inter alia, Justin Wedeking, ‘Supreme Court Litigants and Strategic Framing’, 
in: 54 American Political Science Review (2010), p. 617.  Nicholson and Howard, 
‘Framing Support for the Supreme Court in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore’. Bryna 
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has devoted attention to why and how political actors opt for different post-litigation 
framing strategies in light of a concrete judicial decision. Although analyses of these 
strategies often take place in public debate, a more sophisticated academic theorisation 
and empirical testing has not been carried out. 
 
This article aims to fill that gap. Its assumption is that theories of judicial decision-
making are not only competing academic perspectives on judicial activity, but in less 
sophisticated versions, they are also used by political actors and utilised in political 
struggles over the interpretation of the law and of judicial decisions. Political actors 
have an interest in legitimising favourable judicial outcomes by framing them as the 
result of unbiased processes of decision-making. By using ‘legalist’ framings, all of the 
legitimising potential of the Rule of Law ideal is transferred to the judicial decision. 
Conversely, unfavourable decisions are to be presented as the result of a politically 
biased court. This framing strategy delegitimises the ruling and is a form of retaliation 
against the court. It also appeals to the ideal of the Rule of Law, but only to suggest that 
the unfavourable decision does not meet its standards and is thus illegitimate. What I 
want to argue is that, from this perspective, legalistic framings of the rulings are 
political strategies as much as attitudinal and institutional framings. My hypothesis, 
therefore, is that the selection of framings can be explained by the distance between the 
actors’ preferred judicial outcome and the actual decision of the court.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bogoch and Yifat Holzman-Gazit, ‘Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High 
Court of Justice’, in: 33 Law and Social Inquiry (2008), p. 53.  
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 Methodology and Sources 
 
This article uses a qualitative methodology. To analyse the political framings of the 
ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Resolution 5/X of the Catalan 
Parliament –the ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’- I used parliamentary debates and 
newspaper articles. Although I also analysed, to some extent, earlier periods to construct 
my narrative, the analysis focused on the week subsequent to the decision of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court. An exhaustive newspaper review was performed using 
five different periodicals, which together cover most of the political spectrum. I used the 
progressive Madrid-based EL PAÍS, the conservative Madrid-based EL MUNDO and 
ABC, the conservative Barcelona-based LA VANGUARDIA, and the progressive 
Barcelona-based EL PERIÓDICO. Note that my description of newspapers as 
conservative or progressive is based on admittedly contestable conventional definitions. 
To ensure comprehensiveness, instead of simply searching for key words in a digital 
search engine, I performed an exhaustive review of all articles published in the paper 
and digital editions of these newspapers during the analysed period and selected all 
those that referred to the ruling in one form or another. For the framing analysis in the 
penultimate section, I only included reported speeches of politicians and opinion articles 
written by them and excluded opinion articles written by other subjects or by the 
editorial teams. Parliamentary debates were also used: these were available for this 
period at the website of the Catalan Parlament de Catalunya. Although parliamentary 
debates at the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados and at the Senado were also sought, 
they did not cover the topic of this article during the analysed period. 
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The Political Scenario in Catalonia 
 
The evolution of Catalan Politics in the years before the decision of the Constitutional 
Court had been marked by increasing political polarisation. The 2012 Catalan elections 
gave rise to a complex political landscape. The ruling CiU party lost some support 
compared to the previous elections, but it remained the most voted-for party. 
Furthermore, the pro-referendum parties (CiU, ERC, ICV, and CUP) together obtained 
a large majority
25
. In view of the results, the two most voted-for parties, CiU and ERC, 
reached a governability agreement that included the call for a referendum on self-
determination. With this background, on Wednesday the 23
rd
 of January 2013, the 
Catalan parliament passed the ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’, with 85 votes in favour, 41 
against and only 2 abstentions
26
. The Declaration consisted of nine principles preceded 
by a Preamble. The Preamble begins by stating that Catalonia ‘all along its history has 
manifested democratically its will to self-govern’ and then goes on to relate a narrative 
about the history of the Catalan people, summarising the evolution of the Catalan 
institutions for self-government from the Middle Ages to the present time. 
Subsequently, the body of the Declaration affirmed that the Catalan Parliament agrees 
to initiate the process for ‘the right to decide’ of the Catalan people to become effective 
and that this process will be guided by nine principles: 
 
a. Sovereignty. The Catalan people are deemed to be ‘legally and 
politically a sovereign people’. 
                                                          
25
 David Martí, ‘The 2012 Catalan Election: The First Step Towards Independence?’, 
in: 23 Regional and Federal Studies (2013), p. 507 at p. 513. 
26
 La Vanguardia (digital edition). 2013. El Parlament de Catalunya aprueba la 
declaración de soberanía de CiU y ERC. 23 Jan. 
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b. Democratic legitimacy. The right to decide of the Catalan people will be 
exercised in a ‘scrupulously democratic’ way. 
c. Transparency. All the necessary information and knowledge for the 
exercise of the right to decide will be provided to the Catalan society. 
d. Social cohesion. The Declaration places emphasis on keeping ‘Catalonia 
as only one people’. 
e. Europeanism. The foundational principles of the European Union will be 
promoted. 
f. Legality. Every available legal frame will be used in order to exercise the 
right to decide. 
g. Prominent role of the Catalan Parliament.  
h. Participation. The Catalan institutions must require local and social 
actors to participate in the process. 
 
As stated above, the final text of the Declaration was passed by the Catalan Parliament 
with the support of three parties: the centre-right CiU and the left-wing ERC and ICV. 
Three parties voted against the Declaration: PSC, PP and Ciutadans. Finally, the three 
deputies of the seventh party in the Catalan chamber, the radical left CUP party, did not 
follow any party discipline: while one of the deputies backed the declaration, the two 
remaining deputies abstained. 
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Table 1 The Political Scenario and the Debate on Catalan Sovereignty 
Party Leader (at the 
time of the ruling) 
Preference 
status  
Catalonia 
Preference 
referendum 
Role at 
Catalan level 
Role at Spanish 
level 
CiU Artur Mas   In power from 
2010. 
Formerly 
opposition  
Opposition 
CDC Artur Mas Independent In favour  
UDC J. A. Duran i Lleida Confederated In favour  
ERC Oriol Junqueras  Independent In favour Supporting 
CiU 
government. 
Until 2010, 
member of 
the PSC-led 
government 
Opposition 
PSOE-PSC    Opposition 
from 2010. 
Formerly in 
power 
Opposition 
from 2011. 
Formerly in 
power 
PSOE A.P. Rubalcaba  Federated Against 
PSC Pere Navarro Federated Against 
PP Mariano Rajoy 
(Spanish Level) 
Alicia S. Camacho 
(Catalan level) 
Autonomy Against Opposition In power from 
2011. Formerly 
opposition 
ICV Joan Herrera Federated/ 
Independent 
In favour Opposition  Opposition 
from 2010. 
Formerly 
member of 
PSC-led 
government 
Ciutadans Albert Rivera Autonomy Against Opposition Not running 
CUP No formal 
leadership 
Independent In favour Opposition Opposition 
Own elaboration 
 
Table 1 describes this political landscape at the time of the ruling on the Declaration of 
Sovereignty, including relevant political parties, their leaders, their political roles and 
their stances towards the issues of referendum and independence. Because topics of 
Catalan and Spanish politics will often be discussed throughout this article, I 
recommend the readers refer to this table as often as necessary and to use it as a map of 
the political scenario.  
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As the table shows, political parties had divergent positions regarding the issue of the 
‘right of decide’ of the Catalan people. Beginning from more Catalan-sovereignists 
stances, the small radical-left CUP was in favour of holding a referendum, as the left 
wing ERC. The ruling coalition party, CiU, was also in favour of the referendum. 
However, its two component parties placed slightly different emphases on the process: 
while CDC was clearly in line with the idea of giving voice to Catalan citizens and 
driving Catalonia to independence, UDC insisted more on the need to agree upon the 
referendum with the Spanish State and, if possible, achieve a con-federal solution for 
Catalonia. The left-wing ICV, although it supported the referendum, did not have a clear 
political stance on what outcome they preferred in case such a referendum took place. 
The socialists of PSC had in principle supported the view that Catalan citizens should 
be consulted about their future, but at a later stage, they opposed the holding of the 
referendum with the argument that it had not been agreed upon with the Spanish State. 
Together with PSOE –the party to which it is federated- PSC defended an agreed 
consultation that intended a federalisation of the Spanish Constitution. Finally, PP –in 
power in the Spanish government- and Ciutadans defended that the referendum should 
not take place and advocated in favour of the current State of Autonomies and the status 
quo.  
  
 
The Ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Declaration of Sovereignty 
 
The Spanish Government considered the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan 
Parliament to be unconstitutional, and through the State’s Attorney, it filed an objection 
of unconstitutionality before the Spanish Constitutional Court. The Court reached a 
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decision on 25
 
March 2014 (STC 42/2014), and the ruling had two major outcomes. On 
the one hand, the Court stated that the Declaration of Sovereignty was unconstitutional. 
On the other hand, the Court considered that the ‘right to decide’ of the Catalan citizens 
was not per se unconstitutional if exercised within the constitutional framework. Thus, 
although the Court acknowledged the existence of no other sovereign people but the 
Spanish people, citizens of Catalonia could eventually be consulted if constitutional 
mechanisms were respected. Although the Court is not clear in this regard, this could 
suggest that the referendum could be valid at least after a constitutional amendment. 
According to the Court, if the constitutional amendment was promoted by the 
Parliament of an Autonomous Community, the Spanish Parliament would have to give 
consideration to it. 
 
In this section, I will reconstruct three readings of this ruling: legalist, attitudinal and 
institutionalist. My aim is not to test these three approaches in this case but rather to 
show how the case could be interpreted from these three perspectives in order to 
illustrate, in the next section, how different political actors selected each of these 
readings according to their preferences. 
 
 
A Legalist Reading 
 
Legalist views of judicial decision-making assume that courts simply apply the law to a 
case when adjudicating disputes
27
. Magistrates usually resort to legalistic interpretations 
                                                          
27
 See Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence’. 
Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. 
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of their own activity and dismiss accusations of politicisation. A few days before the 
ruling, for instance, one of the magistrates of the Court, Luis Ortega, said that ‘we are 
not at the service of political parties, that is science fiction’28. Rulings are also, by 
definition, legalistic narratives: courts phrase their decisions as the mere impartial, 
neutral and apolitical application of the legal system to a dispute they must resolve. 
Thus, to reconstruct a legalist narrative for this case, the reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court can be followed. 
 
Before the Court issued the ruling, part of the discussion among legal scholars and 
political actors referred to the question of whether the Resolution of the Catalan 
Parliament had actual legal effects or was simply a political declaration, as the 
Constitutional Court was only allowed to make a decision on the merits in the first case. 
In its ruling, the Court considers that the Resolution 5/X of the Catalan Parliament is a 
‘perfect or definitive act’ in the sense of being a final declaration of the will of the 
Catalan Parliament issued in the exercise of the powers conferred to it by the legal 
system of the Autonomous Community. Furthermore, although the resolution was not 
deemed to have binding effects, it would nonetheless have legal effects because it 
attributes powers inherent to sovereignty to Catalan political actors and because it 
requires the carrying out of concrete actions to give effect to the ‘right to decide’. This 
allowed the Court to consider the Resolution as a legitimate object of review. 
 
Subsequently, the ruling goes on to assess the idea that the Catalan people is a sovereign 
subject. Such idea is, according to the Court, contrary to Arts. 1.2 and 2 of the Spanish 
                                                          
28
 María Fabra, 2014. La tendencia en el Constitucional es mayor a la unidad que a la 
autonomía. El País (digital edition), 17 March. 
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Constitution and to the previous case law of the court (SSTC 6/1981, 12/2008, 13/2009, 
31/2010). The Court considered that, according to Art.1.2 of the Constitution, in the 
current Spanish constitutional system, only the Spanish people are sovereign, and the 
attribution of sovereignty to the people of an Autonomous Community would be a 
negation of the former. Furthermore, such recognition of sovereignty would be 
incompatible with Art.2 SC, which declares ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
Nation’. The Court insists in this point on its previous case-law, according to which the 
autonomy granted by Art.2 SC to Autonomous Communities is not equivalent to 
sovereignty (SSTC 76/1988, 247/2007). The Declaration of Sovereignty would be, in 
addition, contrary to Arts. 1 and 2.4 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia as well as 
Art. 9.1 SC (the primacy of the Constitution) and 168 SC (the rigid procedure of 
constitutional amendment). 
 
Before finishing the resolution, however, the Court assessed the statement in the 
Declaration of Sovereignty regarding the ‘right to decide’ of the Catalan citizens. The 
Court considered that an interpretation could be made according to which such right to 
decide is constitutional, as long as it is not linked to the idea of Catalan sovereignty. 
The Constitutional Court considered that the principle of ‘democratic legitimacy’ 
proclaimed by the second point of the Declaration was compatible with Art.1.1 of the 
Constitution, according to which democracy is a superior value of the Spanish legal 
system. The principle of ‘legality’ in point seven of the Declaration was read in light of 
the idea of the primacy of the Constitution. According to the Court, such primacy did 
not equate to a requirement of adhesion to the Constitution, as the Spanish legal system 
is not based on a conception of militant democracy, but it admits conceptions aimed at 
changing the very functioning of the constitutional system as long as they respect the 
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constitutional mandates and the formal procedures of constitutional amendment. The 
Court recalls, in addition, that according to Arts. 87.2 and 166 of the Spanish 
Constitution, the Parliaments of Autonomous Communities have a right of initiative for 
constitutional amendment, whose merits the Spanish Parliament must give 
consideration to.  
 
In substantive terms, this meant that the Court took an intricate approach: the ‘right to 
decide’, which had been invoked by actors supporting the Declaration, was not 
necessarily unconstitutional. However, the actual exercise of that right could not be 
carried out beyond the constitutional mandates, which, according to the Court, stated 
that only the Spanish people –and not the Catalan people- were sovereign, as was 
defended by the opponents of the Declaration. Implicitly, the Court seemed to suggest 
that a referendum about the status of Catalonia could only be constitutional after a 
constitutional amendment.  
 
In the last part of the ruling, the ‘fallo’, the Court first declares unconstitutional the 
principle of Catalan sovereignty enshrined in the Declaration. Second, however, it 
declares constitutional ‘the right to decide of the citizens of Catalonia’ if interpreted 
according to the legal reasoning of the Court, and it rejects the petition in all other 
regards. In summary, as has been shown, the discourse of the Court in the ruling follows 
a legalist structure, with every decision being depicted as anchored in a neutral and 
apolitical interpretation of the constitutional framework. 
 
 
An Attitudinal Reading 
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Unlike the former reading, an attitudinal reading would suggest that the final decision of 
the ruling was simply the result of the preferences of the magistrates
29
. In general, the 
Spanish media talks about ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ magistrates in the 
Constitutional Court, and it is assumed that each of these blocks is close to the 
preferences of the Spanish main parties: PP and PSOE. As was shown in Table 1 above, 
these two political parties were opposed to the option of independence, and their 
preferences regarding the decision of the Court pointed to the protection of the status 
quo. Only one magistrate, Encarnación Roca, was deemed to be ideologically close to 
the nationalist CiU, one of the parties that supported the Declaration of the Catalan 
Parliament and the possibility of a popular consult on the status of Catalonia. Table 2 
shows the composition of the Court as it was described by the Spanish media
30
. As seen, 
the Court was allegedly formed mainly by conservative magistrates close to PP and by 
progressive magistrates close to PSOE. 
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Table 2 Ideological composition of the Constitutional Court 
Magistrate Appointing organ Ideology 
Attempted 
disqualification 
Francisco de los Cobos 
(President) 
Senate Conservative Yes 
Adela Asua Senate Progressive  
Luis Ignacio Ortega Senate Progressive  
Encarnación Roca Trías Congress of Deputies 
Progressive 
/Catalanist 
 
Andrés Ollero Tassara Congress of Deputies Conservative  
Fernando Valdés Dal-Ré Congress of Deputies Progressive  
Juan José González Congress of Deputies Conservative  
Santiago Martínez-Vares Council of the Judiciary Conservative  
Juan Antonio Xiol Council of the Judiciary Progressive  
Pedro González-Trevijano Government Conservative Yes 
Enrique López Government Conservative Yes 
Ricardo Enríquez Sancho Senate Conservative  
Sources: newspapers. Own elaboration 
 
Furthermore, before the ruling, there was ongoing discussion in Spain about the 
ideological composition of the Court. It was emphasised that some of the magistrates 
had shown anti-nationalist stances in the past
31
. It was said that Pedro Gonzalez 
Trevijano had called the nationalists ‘nazionalists’, with a ‘z’. Enrique López was 
accused of being politically biased because of his writings, in which he called to 
‘expulse the paradoxes of exacerbated nationalism’ from the Spanish institutional 
frame
32
. Furthermore, the President of the Court Francisco de los Cobos had recently 
been the protagonist of a scandal when it was discovered that he was a member of PP at 
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the time of his appointment as magistrate of the Court, a fact he had not declared. De los 
Cobos had also been accused of alleged criticisms of Catalonia and nationalism, as he 
would have written, inter alia, a number of aphorisms in which he called money the 
‘rationalising balm of Catalonia’ and in which he accused nationalism of being ‘the only 
ideology still capable of producing nightmares’33. With this background, the Catalan 
Parliament initiated proceedings to disqualify these three magistrates under the 
accusation of ‘lack of impartiality and independence’, although the ruling was issued 
before such disqualification was processed
34
. 
 
 
An Institutional Reading 
 
An institutionalist internalist reading would suggest that the rules of the institution, 
especially the rules on decision-making, condition the decisions of individual 
magistrates and the outcome of the Court as a whole. An institutionalist externalist 
reading would conversely emphasise the wider institutional context in which the court 
operates and its interaction with other actors
35
. These two variants of institutionalism 
are not, however, incompatible. Together, they can provide for a third narrative of how 
the Court made a decision. 
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On the externalist side, the emphasis would be on how other actors secured control over 
the institution. In this regard, the institutionalist externalist model could be said to 
converge with the attitudinal model: if magistrates are progressive or conservative, it is 
because political parties appoint like-minded lawyers for the Court. Until June 2013, the 
majority of justices of the Court (seven of twelve) belonged to the ‘progressive wing’, 
which was linked to the opposition Socialist Party. However, by the 4
th
 of June, the 
mandate of four of them concluded. Two of the new justices had to be selected by the 
right-wing Government, and the other two had to be selected by the Consejo General 
del Poder Judicial, the Council of the Judiciary
36
. After these appointments, the balance 
of power changed within the Court in favour of the conservative sector. Although the 
sudden death of the conservative magistrate Francisco Hernando reduced the 
conservative majority within the institution, the ruling right-wing Partido Popular 
‘boosted with a great interest the streamlining of the formalities to nominate the new 
magistrate’ in order to recover the 7 against 5 majority37. 
 
In this context, it might be more easily understood how the rules on decision-making 
within the institution –the internalist side of the model- operated in order to produce the 
final outcome. In principle, the magistrate in charge of making a draft resolution was 
Adela Asua, who was closer to the progressive minority. Her initial drafts, which 
considered the Declaration as lacking legal efficacy and, hence, as outside the scope of 
the Court’s powers of review, found the opposition of the conservative majority of 
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magistrates
38
. In March 2014, the media asserted that the President of the Court, 
Francisco Pérez de los Cobos, wanted the ruling to be issued without delay so that if 
Adela Asúa did not present a draft ruling concordant with the position of the 
conservative majority –to annul the Declaration as the Government had requested- she 
would be substituted
39
. 
 
The final decision would be, from this perspective, the result of a compromise between 
the conservative and progressive sectors in the Court. The rules of the institution do not 
require consensus by all magistrates but allow dissenting opinions. However, according 
to Spanish newspapers, ‘The conservative magistrates had a safe seven votes majority, 
but they wanted to avoid at any cost –specially the President - that the Court was 
divided and ended up deciding on the sovereignist declaration by a margin of two 
votes’. The reason seemed to be ‘the memories of the great discredit suffered by the 
Constitutional Court because of the way in which it conducted its debates regarding the 
reform of the Statute [of Autonomy]’40. The outcome could be seen as a compromise 
between both sectors, in which the Court considered that it could review the merits of 
the Declaration and declare it unconstitutional, as the conservative wing preferred, but 
left a door open for the ‘right to decide’ to be exercised within the constitutional 
framework, as progressive magistrates advocated.  
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The Framing by Political Actors 
 
As has been shown, the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court was susceptible to 
interpretations from the perspective of any of the three dominant theories of judicial 
decision-making. In this section, I will show that framings by political actors actually 
correspond, in less sophisticated versions, with these three theories. 
 
Table 3 Framings of the judicial decision by political stance 
 
In favour of 
independence and 
referendum 
Intermediate stances 
Against independence and 
referendum 
Legalist  
Pere Navarro (PSC) 
Ramón Jáuregui 
(PSOE) 
Enric Millo (PP) 
A. Sánchez-Camacho (PP) 
Pedro Gómez (PP) 
Alberto Núñez (PP) 
Carmen Mejías (Ciutadans) 
Attitudinal 
Jordi Turull (CiU) 
Pere Aragonès (ERC) 
Artur Mas (CiU) 
 
 
Institutional 
Pere Aragonès (ERC) 
Isabel Vallet (CUP) 
Alfred Bosch (ERC) 
Josep Vendrell (ICV) 
Joan Herrera (ICV)  
Own elaboration 
 
Table 3 summarises the discourses of the political actors, including only those who 
could be considered unequivocally legalist, attitudinal or institutional. Discourses were 
considered legalist if they resorted to the idea of the Rule of Law, the need to respect 
judicial decisions and the legitimacy of the court. Speeches that used cognitive frames 
related to the ideology or partisanship of the magistrates were considered attitudinal. 
Finally, discourses were considered institutional if they appealed to the relation of the 
court with other political actors or referred to its institutional biases. To justify the 
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classification in Table 3, all speeches are presented and qualitatively analysed in the 
following subsections. 
 
As expected, supporters of the referendum were rather critical of the ruling and accused 
the Court of being politicised, either from institutionalist (i.e., politicisation of the 
institution, connections with other State organs) or attitudinal (most notably, hostile 
preferences of the magistrates) discourses. Opponents of the referendum tended instead 
to make legalist framings of the ruling, although in this case the message was more 
subtle and indirect: instead of explicitly saying that the Court had simply applied the 
law to the case, their speech focused on reclaiming respect for judicial decisions and for 
the Rule of Law. Thus, as theorised, the framings of the ruling were directly connected 
to the preferred outcomes of the political actors. Together with this pattern, however, a 
second one was detected, according to which all actors tried to emphasise those parts of 
the ruling that were closer to their political stance on the question of the referendum: 
opponents of the referendum underlined that the ruling had declared Catalonia not to be 
a sovereign people and that a unilateral plebiscite was unconstitutional, while supporters 
of the referendum, after some hesitation, focused on the idea that at the end of the day, 
the ruling opened the door to a consultation if the constitutional framework was 
respected. Finally, it must be noted that most reactions to the ruling were articulated 
around political concepts. Neither supporters nor opponents of the ruling tried to use 
arguments of a doctrinal type, i.e., referring to concrete legal provisions and their 
interpretation to back or oppose the ruling of the Court. Instead, they preferred to resort 
to highly political framings based on notions such as that of the Rule of Law, the 
partisanship of magistrates or the politicisation of the Court.  
 
 28 
Pro-Referendum Actors: Denial of Legitimacy of a “Political” Court 
 
The reactions of pro-referendum parties immediately after the decision (on 25
th
 March) 
were notably critical. They combined attitudinal references to the ideology of the 
magistrates, institutionalist statements regarding the connections between the main 
Spanish parties and the Court, and general statements about the politicisation of the 
institution. Jordi Turull (CiU/CDC) denied ‘the credibility’ of the decisions of a Court 
in which some of its members are ‘agitators of Catalan-phobia’. This interpretation had 
clear attitudinal reminiscences and was connected to the critiques of some members of 
the Court for their past declarations and their political background. Turull continued by 
saying that the ruling ‘makes clear that the Constitutional Court is not a legal organ, but 
a political organ which decorates its decisions in a juridical way’41. In the statements of 
Pere Aragonès (ERC), attitudinal and institutional-externalist framings converged. He 
stated that the Court had ‘entered into the game of ideology and parliaments’ and that 
‘the opinion expressed by the Catalan Parliament is of much more worth that a decision 
adopted by twelve people appointed at their discretion by two parties, PP and PSOE’42. 
Joan Tardà (ERC) stated that Court was ‘corrupted’43. Finally, the CUP’s response 
seemed harsher than that of any other party. Its deputy Isabel Vallet considered that the 
Court was eminently political and that the proof of its politicisation was that it has 
analysed the issue faster than other ones that were much more important for the society, 
such the law on bankruptcy or the ongoing foreclosures. Furthermore, she did not accept 
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the ruling as a ‘valid’ decision and considered that the exercise of sovereignty is not 
susceptible to being legally assessed
44
. 
 
Statements by political actors continued during the days subsequent to the ruling. 
Debates in the Catalan Parliament, registered in its official publication Diari de Sessions 
del Parlament de Catalunya, show that a slight change could be detected in the 
reactions of pro-referendum actors. They seemed to have learned that they could exploit 
certain parts of the ruling in their favour, even if de-legitimising criticisms of the Court 
were still frequent. The Catalan President, Artur Mas (CiU/CDC), is a good example. In 
his speech to the Catalan Parliament, he recalled that, according to the Court, the ‘right 
to decide’ could be interpreted as constitutional, quoting a paragraph of the ruling. 
However, his criticisms were still harsh. He disparaged the Spanish Constitutional Court 
for making a decision on a political declaration of a Parliament, which was an 
unprecedented move. He made a legalistic concession, saying that the duty of the Court 
was to enforce the Constitution. However, he then suggested that in assessing the 
Declaration of Sovereignty, it had given up its role as a referee at the service of the 
‘entire people, of all the State’45. Furthermore, he reiterated the attitudinal criticism of 
the Court by recalling that the Catalan Parliament had disqualified three members of the 
Court for having made ‘offensive statements against certain political processes boosted 
by the Catalan people’, using the example of the declarations of the magistrate Pedro 
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González Trevijano, in which he used the word ‘nazionalist’, suggesting that someone 
who writes such a thing is not apt to assess what Catalonia does
46
. 
 
In subsequent days, the framings by political actors continued to reflect this tension 
between the idea that the Court was politically biased and the temptation to insist that 
the ruling partially backed pro-referendum stances. Francesc Homs (CiU/CDC) 
considered that, in its small print, the ruling supported the thesis defended by the 
Catalan Government
47
. However, Alfred Bosch (ERC) stated that the content of the 
ruling was foreseeable and that it was ‘an eminently political ruling by a politicised 
Court’48. 
 
 
Intermediate Stances: the Ruling as a Catalyst for a New Political Dialogue 
 
A number of political parties had more intermediate preferences regarding the relation 
between Catalonia and the Spanish State. Leaders of UDC (part of the CiU coalition) 
had often referred to the possibility of a con-federal solution, ICV had a federal 
tradition, and PSC opted for the federal approach after an agreement with PSOE. 
Having said this, the differences between all these parties were clear: while UDC and 
ICV supported the referendum called by the Catalan President, PSC opposed it. This is 
not a minor difference, and it had a real impact on political framings; thus, separate 
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analyses will be devoted to UDC and ICV on the one hand and to PSC on the other. 
However, as I will show, these three parties exhibited a common pattern: because the 
judicial outcome was not far from their preferences, they tried to frame it as a call to 
dialogue and to intermediate solutions, which they regarded with sympathy. 
  
The pro-referendum parties UDC and ICV will be analysed first. On the day of the 
ruling, the reactions of the ICV leaders were rather critical. The Secretary General of the 
party, Josep Vendrell, accused the court of acting ‘as a third legislative chamber’, as it 
had already done with the Statute of Autonomy
49
. The day after, however, the discourse 
of the party became more moderate. The party’s spokesperson in the Catalan 
Parliament, Joan Herrera, criticised the Court for making a pronouncement over a 
‘political declaration’ and made a harsh reference to ‘a sort of controlled democracy’50. 
However, he then stated that the good news was that, according to the ruling, the right 
to decide is legal and legitimate, and thus, the Spanish Government could allow the 
consultation if it wanted
51
. The leader of UDC, Duran i Lleida, was rather moderate 
from the very beginning, and although he considered the ruling an unnecessary mistake, 
he made a call to respect the decision
52
. In subsequent days, he declared that he was 
‘positively surprised’ that the Court had admitted the ‘right to decide [of Catalonia]’ 
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linked to a negotiation
53
. Although not explicitly legalist, the statements by Duran i 
Lleida avoided accusations of politicisation and had legalist reminiscences. In this 
regard, he could be seen as an outlier. The explanation for this could lie in that his party, 
UDC, had been the most moderate within the pro-referendum block, having always 
supported dialogue with the Spanish Government and con-federal solutions for 
Catalonia. The content of the ruling was thus not far from his preferred outcome. At the 
same time, the burden of harsh criticisms of the Court had already been assumed by 
other allied parties, allowing him play a different role. Nevertheless, other UDC actors 
took a slightly less conciliatory stance. Montserrat Surroca, for instance, stated that her 
party was ‘neither going to obey the ruling nor to disobey it’, as the Declaration of 
Sovereignty had, in their view, no legal effects
54
. 
 
As said above, PSC also opted for federal-type solutions for the status of Catalonia, but 
unlike ICV and UDC, it did not support the Declaration of Sovereignty and considered 
that any referendum should be preceded by an agreement with the Spanish Government. 
Maurici Lucena, spokesperson of the PSC in the Catalan Parliament, said that the ruling 
showed that the only way to celebrate the consultation was through agreement between 
the Catalan and Spanish governments
55
. The leader of the PSC, Pere Navarro, made a 
subtly legalistic reading when he said that the ruling had confirmed the interpretation of 
his party that, in order to make a legal consultation, it was necessary to amend the 
Constitution first. This was followed by an invitation to the Catalan President ‘to use the 
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door that the Constitutional Court has left open, jump on the bus of PSC and amend 
together the Constitution’56. The leaders of PSOE –the Spanish socialist party with 
which PSC is federated- said, in addition, that the ruling appealed to the need for 
dialogue
57
. Furthermore, the PSOE spokesman, Ramón Jáuregui, responded to the 
accusations by Alfred Bosh (ERC) that the Court was a politicised institution: ‘The 
Constitutional Court is much more than that, Alfred. I would like that, if you ever had a 
Constitutional Court, did not treat it as bad as you treat this one. Without respect to 
democratic institutions we are in the wrong way’58. 
 
 
Anti-Referendum Actors: Demanding Respect for the Rule of Law 
 
As expected, opponents of the referendum underlined the opposite elements in the 
ruling. Their discourse was constructed around two interrelated strategies: they focused 
on those aspects of the ruling that were closer to their political stance –that the Catalan 
people were not deemed to be sovereign and that the consultation was considered 
impossible under the current constitutional framework- and simultaneously tried to 
reaffirm the legitimacy of the Court.  
 
The PP-led Spanish Government said after the ruling that the law was on their side and 
that the ruling should be respected. The spokesperson of PP in the Catalan Parliament, 
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Enric Millo, asked the Catalan President to respect a decision adopted by unanimity by 
the Court
59
. The same discourse was followed by the leader of PP in Catalonia, Alícia 
Sanchez-Camacho, who urged the Catalan President to respect the judicial decision. 
Furthermore, she explicitly counter-argued against attitudinal criticisms of the Court: 
‘We heard the other day that Mr. Homs [CiU] said that they respect the decisions by all 
(…). But it seems that yesterday we were said that this Court has no credibility, and that 
they are agitators of Catalan-phobia. Respect can be lost in minutes’60. Her discourse 
seemed to be explicitly directed at reasserting the legitimacy of the Court. She recalled 
that there were members of the Court nominated at the request of CiU, thus emphasising 
its internal plurality and representativeness, and she insisted that such party had often 
brought cases before it
61
. Some days after the ruling, Pedro Gómez de la Serna (PP) 
suggested that the ruling had confirmed the thesis of his party and that ‘in democracy, 
the normal thing is to abide to the rulings’62. Even the leader of PP in Galicia, Alberto 
Núñez Feijóo, dared to give his opinion on the topic: ‘That a party calls to a rebellion 
against the highest constitutional organ [of the State] which has issued a ruling by 
unanimity is a surprising thing. There is just one possibility for Mas: to accept the 
decisions by the courts and to come back to the path of the Rule of Law’63. 
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Finally, the Ciutadans party exhibited similar patterns in the discourse of its leaders. 
Carina Mejías said that the ruling showed that the Catalan Government was acting 
‘against the legal system’ and that it should ‘act according to the Constitution’64. The 
leader of Ciutadans, Albert Rivera, went further and called the possibility of a unilateral 
declaration of independence suggested by the Catalan President ‘a coup d’Etat against 
the Statute [of Autonomy of Catalonia] and the Constitution’65. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Declaration of Sovereignty of 
the Catalan Parliament is a major episode of the political dynamics of the Catalan 
sovereignist process. Because of this importance, political actors devoted a great deal of 
effort to the framing of the decision. For analytical purposes, framings by political 
actors could be classified into any of the three academic theories of judicial decision-
making. With such framings, politicians followed different post-litigation strategies in 
which the will to use the ruling to back their preferred policy outcomes was combined 
with the intent to legitimise the Court as a neutral adjudicator of the Constitution or, 
alternatively, to delegitimise it as a politically biased institution. Attitudinal and 
institutional framings of the ruling were linked to the ideas of politicisation and 
partisanship of the Court, while legalist framings more subtly resorted to the idea of the 
Rule of Law and the need to respect judicial decisions. Furthermore, legalist framings 
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reasserted the legitimacy of the constitutional status quo and the capacity of the Spanish 
Constitution to regulate the ongoing political conflict over the Catalan sovereignist 
process. 
 
The political reactions to the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court show how such 
an institution can become the object of intense political debates: episodes of the 
judicialisation of politics become, at the same time, catalysts for the politicisation of the 
interpretation of judicial decisions. The framings of the ruling also show the disputed 
nature of the notion of the Rule of Law in concrete contexts and how judicial decisions 
might contribute to debate in this regard. For opponents of the referendum, the ideal of 
the Rule of Law was an instrument to be mobilised as part of their political strategy. 
Probably as a reaction, some of the supporters of the referendum asserted that the 
legitimacy of their claim to a vote is higher than that of the Spanish legal system: ‘the 
time has come to blow off the Spanish laws’, the leader of the ERC party recently 
said
66
. This clash between legality and legitimacy, in which the idea of the Rule of Law 
is at the core, continues to be one of the most prominent aspects of Catalan and Spanish 
political life.   
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